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This paper considers the practical question of why people do not behave in the way they
ought to behave. This question is a practical one, reaching both into the normative and
descriptive domains of morality.That is, it concerns moral norms as well as empirical facts.
We argue that two main problems usually keep us form acting and judging in a morally
decent way: firstly, we make mistakes in moral reasoning. Secondly, even when we know
how to act and judge, we still fail to meet the requirements due to personal weaknesses.
This discussion naturally leads us to another question: can we narrow the gap between
what people are morally required to do and what they actually do? We discuss findings
from neuroscience, economics, and psychology, considering how we might bring our moral
behavior better in line with moral theory. Potentially fruitful means include nudging, training,
pharmacological enhancement, and brain stimulation. We conclude by raising the question
of whether such methods could and should be implemented.
Keywords: descriptive, morality, normative, reasoning, neuroethics
INTRODUCTION
A sharp distinction has been made between the descriptive domain
of morality, i.e., the way agents behave or make moral judgments,
and the normative domain, i.e., the way agents ought to behave
or make moral judgments. In the empirical sciences, there has
been an on-going debate about which theory describes moral
decision-making best. Similarly, normative moral philosophy has
been discussing which ethical theory is superior to the others.
However, whenever we watch the news or observe our social
environment, both of these issues are of comparably little impor-
tance to us. The question that usually concerns us is not: How do
people behave? Or: How ought they to behave? But rather: Why
do they fail to behave in the way they should?
This last question is not purely an empirical one, as it involves
an assumption about how one ought to behave. Nonetheless, it
is neither an ultimately normative one, as it relies on empirically
observable facts about human behavior. The issue is rather a prac-
tical one, reaching both into the descriptive and the normative
domains of morality. It naturally leads to another practical ques-
tion: What can we do about the fact that people often do not behave
in a way they are morally required to?
In this essay, we elaborate on these two related practical issues
and give an outline of how to resolve them. We argue that two main
problems usually keep us from acting and judging in a morally
decent way: Firstly, we make mistakes in moral reasoning. Sec-
ondly, even when we know how we ought to act and judge, we still
fail to meet our obligations due to personal weaknesses.
HOW OUGHT WE TO ACT?
Normative ethics tells us what we ought to do. Three of the most
prominent contemporary theories are consequentialism, deontol-
ogy, and virtue ethics (Crisp, 1998/2011, cf. Tobler et al., 2008).
There is no clear, simple, and universally accepted definition for
any of them; therefore we shall give a brief account of how these
concepts are understood in the present paper. Albeit rough and
sketchy, we assume that these characterizations serve our present
purpose well enough.
In one of its general forms, consequentialism tells us that the
outcomes (consequences) of our actions ought to be as good as
possible (cf. Scheffler, 1988). There are numerous consequentialist
theories which in turn can be classified in various ways. Philoso-
phers traditionally distinguish act and rule consequentialism. Act
consequentialism holds that the outcome of single actions ought
to be as good as possible. As consequences of single actions are
often difficult to predict, attempts have been made to facilitate the
decision process of an agent. In this vein, rule consequentialism
focuses on action-guiding rules, claiming that the consequences
of the rules be as good as possible. Actions are then evaluated with
respect to these rules.
Also, different consequentialist approaches disagree on what
the goodness of an outcome consists of. The most popular one,
utilitarianism, holds that we ought to do what increases people’s
happiness or decreases their unhappiness. Hereby, the good of
everyone has to be taken into account and everyone’s good counts
equally. We ought to act in a way that maximizes the good of all and
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in no other way. Jeremy Bentham, one of the founders of classical
utilitarianism, argued for a felicific calculus that allows measuring
the outcome of various actions, i.e., the pleasure these actions may
produce. Such a method presupposes that all pleasures are com-
parable and quantifiable and that they are, as consequences of an
action, to greater or lesser certainty predictable. After such hedonic
approaches to (experienced) utility had been largely abandoned
by economics, they have more recently been taken up again by
behavioral economics (Kahneman et al., 1997). Moreover, some
formal treatments of welfare economics (Harsanyi, 1955) and
prosocial preferences (e.g., Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) also have
consequentialist roots.
“Deontology” is a collective term denoting a variety of theo-
ries which, from a linguistic point of view, assign a special role
to duties, as “deontology” refers to the study or science of duty
(deon= duty). Deontology requires us to fulfill our moral duties
but such a general claim is also made by consequentialist theo-
ries, which hold that it is our moral duty to act in such a way
that the outcomes be as good as possible. Therefore, deontology
is sometimes identified with non-consequentialism, the claim that
the wrongness or rightness of an action is not only determined
by the badness or goodness of its consequences. For instance,
an action can be assigned intrinsic value because of the agent’s
willingness that the principle – or maxim – on which the action
is performed should become a universal law, a criterion estab-
lished by Kant (1965/1785). Kant’s ethics and the theories derived
from them are often seen as prominent candidates of deontol-
ogy. Another central requirement of Kant’s ethics is to never treat
a human being as a means to an end. Thus according to Kant
and in contrast to consequentialism, it would be morally wrong
to kill one person if thereby two other human lives could be
saved.
Usually, deontology is schematically conceived of as rivalling
both consequentialism and virtue ethics. Virtue ethics usually goes
beyond the question of what we morally ought to do. This has his-
torical reasons: The earliest prominent account of virtue ethics has
been developed by Aristotle (2000) who was concerned with the
best way for a human being to live. A central claim of contempo-
rary virtue ethicists is that living virtuously is required in order to
flourish. Roughly speaking, a virtue is a disposition to act appro-
priately for the right reason and thus requires practical wisdom.
Flourishing can be described as living fulfilled and happily, which
goes beyond mere momentary subjective well-being but refers to
an overall outlook and life as a whole.
All of these theories are primarily concerned with the ques-
tion of how we ought to act rather than how individuals actu-
ally do behave. We shall turn to this topic in the following
section.
HOW DOWE ACT?
Empirical research on human moral behavior has focused pri-
marily on two topics: action and judgment. As these two aspects
of moral behavior have been studied using rather different
approaches, we shall treat each of them separately here. First, we
consider the literature studying the effects of norms on people’s
actions (Bicchieri, 2006; Gibson et al., in press). Second, we shall
focus on the literature studying the psychological mechanisms
underlying moral judgments (Greene et al., 2001; Moll et al., 2005;
Hauser, 2006; Prinz, 2006; Mikhail, 2007).
From a wider perspective, the question arises whether moral
judgment translates into moral behavior. This issue is controver-
sial and has received a variety of answers (e.g., Schlaefli et al.,
1985). One view (Bebeau et al., 1999) suggests that a moral act
requires not only that an agent judges one course of action as
moral but also that she identifies a situation as moral (e.g., that
consequences of distinct courses of action have differential wel-
fare implications; moral sensitivity), chooses the moral over other
courses of action (moral motivation) and persists to implement
the goal of the action (moral character). In this view, it would
be expected that judgment and action are positively but weakly
correlated, which seems to be the case (Blasi, 1980).
MORAL ACTION
One of the most successful approaches to study moral action has
been to observe how people’s behavior changes depending on the
saliency of a norm. Scholars working in this field developed several
models to show how the utility assigned by a person to different
outcomes in a given situation is modified by the presence of a
norm. Norms motivate compliant behavior mainly in two ways:
(a) they modify the expectations an individual has regarding oth-
ers’behavior (Bicchieri, 2006) and (b) they generate a personal cost
for violating the action course prescribed by the norm (Gibson
et al., in press).
While Bicchieri’s work focused mainly on providing a theo-
retical description of how and when social norms are most likely
to emerge and influence individuals behavior, other scholars pro-
vided empirical evidence demonstrating the influence of norms on
behaviors in a social context. For instance, recently Gibson et al. (in
press) tested the influence of the moral obligation of being honest
(or not lying) on individuals’behavior in an economic context. The
authors tested the hypothesis that when being incentivized to lie by
being able to make a greater profit through not telling the truth,
the willingness of an individual to behave immorally, i.e., to lie,
was correlated with the importance she assigned to being honest.
More specifically, those individuals attributing high importance
to the honesty norm were extremely insensitive to the cost of
telling the truth, which suggests that the moral value of respecting
a moral duty (of being honest) can outweigh economic costs of
respecting it and even prevent utilitarian cost-benefit trade-offs
altogether.
MORAL JUDGMENT
Whereas psychological research on moral judgments has cap-
tured them predominantly as a cognitive, controlled process, and
focused on moral development in the 20th century (Piaget, 1932;
Kohlberg, 1976), it has in recent years mainly developed around
two research questions: (a) do moral judgments stem from intu-
itions or from conscious reasoning and (b) which psychological
processes are involved in moral intuitions (Cushman et al., 2010).
Roughly, we can distinguish four different approaches to these
questions.
From a first perspective, following Hume’s (1960) idea
that moral judgments result from “gut feelings”, some schol-
ars proposed that moral judgments predominantly result from
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intuitions of an emotional nature (Prinz, 2006, see also Prinz,
2007; Woodward and Allman, 2007).
Second, others agree that moral judgments indeed stem from
intuitions but they deny that such intuitions are of emotional
nature, arguing instead that moral intuitions are the product of
moral specific psychological mechanisms named “universal moral
grammar” (Hauser, 2006; Mikhail, 2007; Huebner et al., 2008).
According to this view, neither conscious reasoning nor emotions
play a causal role in determining moral judgments, suggesting that
these two processes actually occur after the moral judgment has
been produced by the “moral grammar” mechanism.
From a third point of view other scholars put forward a dual-
process theory of moral judgment (Greene et al., 2004) suggesting
that moral judgments result from two psychological mechanisms:
emotions and conscious reasoning. It is consequently claimed
that different moral judgments are underpinned by different
psychological systems (Cushman et al., 2010).
Finally on a very similar stance, a fourth theory acknowledges
that moral judgments rely on multiple psychological mechanisms,
and therefore that both emotions and conscious reasoning play a
role in moral judgments. However, in contrast with the third view
described above, it is argued that different moral judgments are not
underpinned by different psychological systems, but rather that
all moral judgments will involve cognitive and emotional mecha-
nisms in competition against each other when a moral judgment
is produced (Moll et al., 2005, 2008).
NEURAL UNDERPINNINGS
The advent of neuroimaging methods allowed to study the intact
brain of healthy volunteers while they make moral judgments
and decisions. This line of research has identified a variety of
brain regions that are active during moral cognition (Figure 1; for
review, see e.g.: Moll et al., 2005,2008; Raine andYang,2006; Forbes
and Grafman, 2010). These regions include the prefrontal cortex,
particularly ventral, medial, dorsolateral, and frontopolar subre-
gions, posterior cingulate cortex, anterior temporal lobe, superior
temporal cortex, temporoparietal junction, striatum, insula, and
amygdala. Many of these regions are also implicated in “theory
of mind” tasks requiring consideration and inference of others’
thoughts and desires (Bzdok et al., 2012) and impaired in patients
with antisocial disorders, in agreement with the notion of impaired
moral decision-making (Figure 2; Raine and Yang, 2006).
One could next ask whether neuroimaging can contribute to
informing theories of moral decision-making. Could it help decid-
ing between the different theories outlined in 2.2 (even though
some of them may not be mutually exclusive)? Or, more specifi-
cally, can neuroimaging inform us about the degree to which emo-
tions are involved in moral judgment? When asking such questions
one is often tempted to make reverse inferences from brain activa-
tion to mental function. However, given that most brain regions
contribute to more than one function, such inferences are at best
probabilistic (Poldrack, 2006, 2011). Moreover, they are limited by
the response specificity of the brain region under study and by the
precision with which mental functions are parsed conceptually and
assessed empirically (Poldrack,2006). Nevertheless, some attempts
to answer those questions have been made.
For example, an extension to Hume’s view mentioned above
may be suggested by the involvement of dorsal and lateral frontal
regions in moral judgment (e.g., Greene et al., 2001). This would
be based on the notion that these regions play a stronger role
in more deliberate, goal-directed, and cognitive than automatic
and emotional functions (Forbes and Grafman, 2010). More-
over, all of the regions implicated in moral judgment have been
implicated also in other mental functions. This seeming lack of
evidence for a neural substrate exclusively devoted to moral func-
tions (Young and Dungan, 2012) does not support the universal
moral grammar approach; if one assumes that moral functions
have evolved from non-moral functions or that the mental func-
tions required for other types of judgments can be used also in the
moral domain (Tobler et al., 2008) it is perhaps not surprising that
so far no region has been singled out as a uniquely moral center
of the brain. In principle though it is still conceivable that finer
grained methods, such as single cell recordings, may reveal such a
substrate.
Neuroimaging and lesion work also point toward a role for
emotion in moral judgment. The ventromedial prefrontal cortex
(vmPFC) is involved in emotion processing and also activated
when a subject makes moral judgments (reviewed in Young and
Koenigs, 2007). Lesions of this region result in blunted affect
(hypo-emotionality) as well as increased emotional reactivity to
environmental events (Anderson et al., 2006). Activations are
increased by pictures with moral emotive content (depicting, e.g.,
abandoned children, physical assaults) compared to pictures with
non-moral emotive content of similar emotional valence and
sociality (Moll et al., 2002; Harenski and Hamann, 2006) and by
moral compared to semantic judgments (Heekeren et al., 2003,
2005). Patients with lesions of the vmPFC are more likely than
controls to endorse harming someone in order to benefit a greater
number of other people (Ciaramelli et al., 2007; Koenigs et al.,
2007; Thomas et al., 2011). In healthy subjects the strength of
skin conductance responses to such moral dilemmas correlates
inversely with the propensity to endorse harm for the greater good
(Moretto et al., 2010). By contrast, vmPFC patients fail to gener-
ate such emotive responses before endorsing harm (Moretto et al.,
2010). Thus, at least some moral judgments appear to be caused
by emotions.
Although much of the literature has focused on prefrontal cor-
tical regions, moral judgment, and decision-making are clearly not
a purely prefrontal or, more generally, neocortical matter. Activa-
tion in the striatum, for example, is affected by the moral status
of a partner with whom one performs economic exchanges (Del-
gado et al., 2005) and reflects behavioral sensitivity to the “moral
expected value” (number of lives saved) of moral actions (Shenhav
and Greene, 2010; Figure 1B). Based on its general role in action
selection (Balleine et al., 2009), one would also expect the dorsal
striatum to contribute to the selection of moral actions. The amyg-
dala contributes to the learning of fear and distress experienced by
others (Blair, 2007; Olsson et al., 2007); empathy-induced insula
activation correlates with subsequent prosocial behavior (Masten
et al., 2011). Thus, although these regions may primarily serve
different functions they can nevertheless be harnessed for moral
judgments and decisions.
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FIGURE 1 | Brain regions implicated in moral judgment and
decision-making. (A) Cortical regions. Note that the posterior cingulate
cortex and the angular gyrus (temporoparietal junction) have also been
implicated in moral judgments (shown in Figure 2). aPFC, anterior prefrontal
cortex; aTL, anterior temporal lobe; DLPFC, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex;
lOFC, lateral orbitofrontal cortex; STS, superior temporal sulcus; vmPFC,
ventromedial prefrontal cortex. Adapted with permission from Moll et al.
(2005). (B,C) Example for striatal involvement in moral decision-making. The
task employed moral dilemmas. In each trial, subjects rated how morally
acceptable it was to save a group of individuals from death with a known
probability rather than a single individual with certainty. Across trials, group
size, and probability varied. Group size and probability should be multiplied to
compute the expected number of lives saved. (B) Regions in ventral striatum
previously identified by Knutson et al. (2005) as processing reward value. (C)
In the regions shown in (B), individual neural sensitivity (contrast estimates of
activation increases) correlated with behavioral sensitivity (beta estimates in
rating) to the expected number of lives saved. Adapted with permission from
Shenhav and Greene (2010). This finding is in line with the notion that moral
functions can be underpinned by neural mechanisms that have originally
evolved for different functions, such as reward processing (Tobler et al., 2008).
PEOPLE DO NOT BEHAVE IN A WAY THEY OUGHT TO
Combining insights from the two previous sections, this
part of the paper will establish the claim that human
beings often do not behave in a way they ought to.
Although it is clear that discrepancies can arise from
a variety of issues, including moral sensitivity, judgment,
motivation, and character, we will concentrate on two more
recently discussed phenomena: cognitive biases and emotional
influences.
Both these phenomena are morally problematic in that they
reflect the influence of morally irrelevant features on actions and
judgments. We shall briefly clarify this point for each of the three
ethical theories outlined in the section “How Ought We to Act?”
above.
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FIGURE 2 | Comparison of brain regions preferentially activated during
moral judgment and decision-making (green), regions impaired in
patients with antisocial disorders such as antisocial personality disorder
and psychopathy (red) and common regions (yellow). One possible
interpretation is that emotions as underpinned by the common regions
prevent breaking of moral rules, the defining deficit of antisocial personality
disorders. The angular gyrus lies at the junction of temporal and parietal
cortex. Reprinted with permission from Raine and Yang (2006).
As mentioned before, consequentialism requires that only the
ultimate consequences of an action or judgment are relevant to its
moral evaluation. Therefore, features such as the emotional state
of the agent or the framing of several options to choose from are
not to be taken into account. However, as we shall elaborate in
the following, there are a variety of instances in which agents are
influenced by such cues and therefore do not act and judge in a
morally decent way.
From a Kantian point of view, a morally right action or judg-
ment is to be made from duty, that is, out of reverence for the moral
law. Accordingly, any other feature of a situation, such as the agent’s
uneasy feeling toward the morally prescribed action course, is to
be ignored. However, empirical evidence will be given below that
individuals often fail to meet this normative requirement.
Virtue ethics outlines the character traits which distinguish
a virtuous person. Amongst them are the faculty of practical
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reasoning and specific virtues such as justice or temperance. There
is, however, solid evidence that agents frequently fail to display
these traits in their behavior and judgments, as this section shall
make clear.
In the following, we shall explain in greater detail in what ways
individuals are biased or influenced by their emotions. For some
cases, we shall, by way of example, explain how the actions and
judgments in question are morally dubious from a deontological,
consequentialist, or virtue ethical perspective.
BIASED BEHAVIOR
Briefly, a cognitive bias is an unconscious tendency to judge a
certain element in a way that depends on one’s own prefer-
ences, expectations, and experiences. Cognitive biases are similar
to perceptual biases such as optical illusions (e.g., the Müller-Lyer
illusion, Müller-Lyer, 1889). Instead of influencing our perceptual
skills, cognitive biases affect people’s cognitive capacities. We shall
give some examples for this phenomenon below.
Firstly, a known cognitive bias that strongly affects moral
actions is the so-called bystander effect, i.e.,“the more bystanders to
an emergency, the less likely, or the more slowly, any one bystander
will intervene to provide aid” (Darley and Latané, 1968, p. 1). Dar-
ley and Latané (1968) recreated an emergency situation in the lab
in order to test the reactions of participants. The higher the num-
ber of bystanders, the lower the percentage of participants who
decided to intervene and the longer the time it took them to do
so. Presumably, people recognize the badness of the situation, yet
feel a “diffusion of responsibility” and so do not act accordingly.
However, such a behavior is morally questionable. For instance,
from a deontological perspective, it is highly plausible to assume
that an agent has a strong duty to help a victim in an emergency.
Besides, such a duty is often legally prescribed, i.e., non-assistance
of a person in danger is widely regarded as tort. The presence of
bystanders and their number does not relieve the agent from his
moral duty. Failure to act in accordance with the duty to help is
thus a severe moral transgression from a deontological point of
view.
Secondly, the next cognitive bias taken into consideration here is
known as the identifiable victim effect (Schelling, 1968; Redelmeier
and Tversky, 1990): one is more likely to help a victim if he is eas-
ily identifiable. An example of this behavior is people’s widespread
inclination to save one little child from drowning in a shallow pond
but to refrain from making a small donation that would save 25
children from starving to death in Africa (cf. Hauser, 2006). This
pattern of results was consistently found in numerous previous
studies observing people’s behavior in similar situations (Cal-
abresi and Bobbitt, 1978; Redelmeier and Tversky, 1990; Viscusi,
1992; Whipple and Swords, 1992). Again, this is morally dubi-
ous behavior, as we shall argue from a virtue ethicist’s viewpoint.
Generally, charity and justice (or fairness) are regarded as moral
virtues. Assume further, plausibly enough, that the overwhelm-
ingly important point about being charitable is the benefit of the
person receiving aid. Then a virtuous agent would help both the
drowning child and the starving kids. Helping one but not the
others seems to amount to a failure of exhibiting charity and
justice and therefore to non-virtuous behavior. From a conse-
quentalist perspective it could be argued that saving 25 is likely to
have better consequences than saving one. Thus, failing to save the
larger number would presumably be morally dubious also from a
consequentialist perspective.
EMOTIONALLY INFLUENCED BEHAVIOR
Among the elements influencing moral behavior, emotions play an
important role. Although, as for cognitive biases, people are usu-
ally unaware of the influence that emotions have on their behavior,
several studies have shown that brain areas associated with emo-
tion are involved in various decision-making tasks, including the
formation of moral judgments.
A seminal study by Greene et al. (2001) has shown that emo-
tions are usually sensitive to the means used for an action, while
cognitive processes are sensitive to the consequences resulting from
this action.
Other studies investigating the role of emotions in moral judg-
ment showed that moral condemnation of an event (i.e., how
wrong you think something is) is strongly influenced by the emo-
tional state of the person evaluating it. Haidt and colleagues
(Wheatley and Haidt, 2005; Schnall et al., 2008; Eskine et al., 2011)
ran a series of studies which showed that induced disgust can yield
harsher condemnations of a set of disgust-related moral violations
such as incest.
Recently, we (Ugazio et al., 2012) have provided evidence that
when a person judges a moral scenario, different emotional states
will influence her choices in opposite ways. People who were
induced to feel anger were more likely to judge a moral action
in a permissive way compared to people in a neutral emotional
state, and people induced to feel disgust were more likely to judge
the same actions in a less permissive way.
The influence of emotional states on moral judgments and
actions, in particular if the emotions stem from morally irrelevant
factors of the situation, is morally problematic according to all the
moral theories outlined in Section “How Ought We to Act?”. Con-
sider consequentialism first and recall that from this perspective,
the only aspects relevant to a moral evaluation are the outcomes
of an action, decision, etc. In particular, the emotions of the agent
are only relevant to the extent to which they are part of the overall
utility affected by the outcomes. Hence, emotions are problematic
if they influence an action or judgment such that it does not lead
to the best possible outcome.
According to deontology, a morally right action or judgment is
to be performed out of duty. Kant (1965/1785) famously declined
that an action out of inclination fulfills this criterion. As emo-
tions are regarded as inclinations of this sort, a judgment or action
determined by an emotion cannot be morally right.
From the point of view of virtue ethics, the actions and judg-
ments described in this section seem to be morally questionable
because they do not seem to stem from virtuous practical rea-
soning. A virtuous person takes her passions into account in an
adequate manner, yet she is presumably not dominated by their
influence. Moreover, it might be the case that the actions and
judgments described are morally dubious because they go against
the virtue of temperance. However, the extent to which practical
reasoning and temperance are non-virtuously counteracted will
depend on the extent to which the action or judgment in question
is influenced by the emotions.
Having given evidence for the claim that individuals often do
not behave and judge in a morally sound way, we shall in the
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following section provide details on what we believe are the most
important reasons for these failures.
WHY DOWE NOT BEHAVE IN MORALLY DECENT WAYS?
A first step toward a solution to the problem that people often
do not behave in morally decent ways consists in analyzing the
reasons and mechanisms of this behavior. Our hypothesis is that
we do not behave in a way we ought to either because we have
mistaken beliefs about what we ought to do or because we fail to
carry out the right action despite our better knowledge.
For the first problem – we make mistakes in moral reasoning –
a range of different causes can be given. The most obvious one
is a lack of cognitive capacities. For instance, we suddenly find
ourselves to be free-riders on a train because we simply forgot
to validate our ticket. In this case, it is simply bad memory, lack
of planning, distraction, or time pressure that led us to a moral
transgression.
Inappropriate moral decision-making may also occur as a con-
sequence of people’s ignorance of important information. Such
ignorance then prevents them from drawing the correct conclu-
sion how to act. For example, a consumer who wants to support
fair working conditions may make a wrong decision because he
is not aware that the company selling the product he chooses has
recently been found guilty of sweatshop labor.
In addition, defective moral reasoning may be behind cogni-
tive biases and phenomena such as the identifiable victim effect as
described in the previous section. It seems to stem from a lack of
reflection on the two scenarios, their comparison and moral eval-
uation, ultimately leading to the violation of the virtues of justice
and fairness.
The second problem – despite knowing how we ought to act,
we fail to carry out the right action – can be analyzed in a variety
of ways. We will consider only a selection here.
Failure to act in a way that has been acknowledged of being the
morally correct one may be due to personal weaknesses. The most
prominent one is akrasia, sometimes also described as weakness
of the will (cf. Kalis et al., 2008). We shall not distinguish between
akrasia and weakness of will in this paper. A person is called akratic
if she acts against her own standards or aims. Succumbing to
some temptation, e.g., eating another portion of ice-cream despite
your knowing you are thereby taking away someone else’s share, is
usually regarded as an akratic action (cf. Austin, 1961).
The concept of akrasia depends heavily on the underlying idea
of man. If we share Socrates’ view of a completely rational homo
economicus, akrasia simply does not exist. Similarly, Aristotle and
Aquinas have regarded akrasia as a result of defective practical rea-
soning whose result is a morally bad action (see also Hare, 1963;
Davidson, 1970). However, if we believe that akrasia goes beyond
fallacious reasoning, the difficult question arises of what akra-
sia actually is. Some have claimed that it is a conflict of competing
forces, for instance, according to Augustine, between incompatible
volitions. Others have described it as an instance of self-deception
(Wolf, 1985; Schälike, 2004). In an Aristotelian vein, Beier (unpub-
lished manuscript, see also Beier, 2010) argues that it is a result of
underdeveloped virtues, that is, a defect in character building.
As far as we know, the philosophical concepts and theories
concerning akrasia and related phenomena have not yet been
linked to empirical research on defects of self-control, empathy,
and self-involvement. Such an enterprise might, however, provide
fruitful insights for both approaches. As the literature on behav-
ioral and neuroscientific research is vast, we shall confine ourselves
to a very brief review of evidence concerning self-control here.
An action out of self-control is generally defined as the choice
of larger-later rewards over smaller-sooner ones (Siegel and Rach-
lin, 1995). Self-control has also been defined as the regulation of
habits. From another perspective, self-control amounts to the con-
trol of emotional reactions (Ochsner and Gross, 2005). Both the
second and the third approach regard self-control as a control of
automatic reactions involving similar neural circuits. Neuroscien-
tific research investigating the brain areas involved suggests that
the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) modulates the value
signal encoded in the vmPFC which in turn drives choices and
decisions (Hare et al., 2009). The DLPFC promotes task-relevant
processing and eliminates irrelevant activities. Future research into
DLPFC and its interactions with vmPFC and other brain regions
may shed new light on how to analyze self-control and akrasia and
how to influence those phenomena.
In sum, the philosophical conception of akrasia may be linked
to a lack of self-control in the following way: relying on Beier, akra-
sia can be regarded as defective character building which essentially
involves the development of self-control. This, in turn, will yield
agents’ falling prey to morally irrelevant aspects of a situation, such
as cognitive biases or emotional influences, which affect behavior
and judgment. To illustrate, consider an example from the previ-
ous section: depending on their emotional states, subjects regarded
moral transgressions more or less severe (Ugazio et al., 2012). That
is, they could not separate their feelings from a consideration of
a moral scenario which amounts to a defect of control over the
emotions.
Another issue that hinders us from acting in morally decent
ways may be certain character traits. For instance, fanatic religiosity
sometimes turns people into murderers. Such traits are presum-
ably the product of both genetic dispositions and their shaping
through education and self-reflection.
A general reason for both morally fallacious reasoning and
failure to carry out the action identified as the right one is the evo-
lutionary background of human beings. Morality can be viewed
as a product of the phylogenetic history of our species which has
evolved in an environment different from the one we live in today.
More precisely, it is commonly believed that reciprocity became a
part of moral behavior because it enhanced the evolutionary fit-
ness of reciprocating individuals (reciprocal altruism, cf. Trivers,
1971). Similarly, prosocial behavior within a group increased the
reproductive abilities of its members in comparison to non- or
anti-socially behaving groups (group selection, cf. Sober and Wil-
son, 1998). Likewise, altruistic behavior toward one’s own kin may
increase the likelihood of spreading the shared genes (kin selection,
cf. Hamilton, 1964).
To give some examples for evolutionary explanations of moral
behavior, immediate and strong emotional reactions to a given
situation probably evolved because they facilitate a quick reaction
which in turn improved survival, for instance the fight-or-flight
response to predators. The theory of kin selection can explain why
humans evoke emotional reactions such as caring love toward
their offspring and may favor them over foreigners: by helping
the former and not the latter, their own genes are more likely to
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be passed on in the future. Likewise, we are now equipped with
biases that automatically and unconsciously guide us in a way
that helps to spread our genes. For instance, the identifiable vic-
tim effect increased the safety of the young in the agent’s close
environment who shared genes with him with higher probabil-
ity than did children further away. According to group selection,
such biased behavior also improved the evolutionary fitness of
one’s own group, as helping close-by group members rather than
faraway out-group individuals would favor one’s own group and
eventually the agent himself.
Related to this point, reasons for why we do not behave in
morally decent ways can be regarded from a cultural perspective.
On this view, morality can be seen as a relatively recent develop-
ment, crystallized in laws and rules for social conduct. In this vein,
the philosopher Nietzsche (1966, p. 228) has argued against moral
systems such as Kantian, Christian, and Utilitarian ethics, criticiz-
ing that these codes of conduct are“detrimental to the higher men”
while benefiting the “lowest.” From a similar perspective, morality
may be seen as a fear of punishment which evolved originally and
is exploited by legal systems. In this view, failures of morality arise
whenever people do not experience enough fear of punishment.
Presumably, the lack may come from the person or the situation.
Empirical research proves helpful to investigate and explain
each of the problems mentioned, providing a basis on which we
can search for solutions. We shall turn to this topic in the following
section.
IMPROVING MORAL BEHAVIOR
Having provided evidence (see section “People do not behave in
a way they ought to”) that people often make inconsistent, if
not mistaken, moral decisions and act accordingly, and having
explored possible explanations for such irrational behavior (in the
previous section), in this section we discuss possible means by
which improving humans’ moral decision capacities, particularly
via nudging, training, pharmacology, and lastly brain stimulation.
NUDGING
A nudge has been defined as an “aspect of the choice architec-
ture that alters people’s behavior in a predictable way without
forbidding any options” (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008, p. 6). Other
than regulating, nudging does not eliminate possible courses of
action. For example, a school canteen can increase pupils’ intake
of vitamins by placing fruit salad or similar desserts in front of
the chocolate cakes and sweets. This would be a nudge, whereas
banning all alternatives to a healthy dessert would be a regulation.
Nudging makes use of inclinations and biases, e.g., the fact that
people tend to favor items displayed at eye level or often eat the
portion they are served regardless of its size. Marketing strategies
have benefited from these insights long ago, relying on long lasting
research projects into consumer habits and psychology.
Nudging has mainly been investigated as a means to tackle
population health issues, such as obesity and addiction to alcohol,
nicotine, or other substances (Downs et al., 2009; Just and Payne,
2009; Zimmerman, 2009). However, it can be equally relied on in
order to approach moral issues: it provides paternalistic institu-
tions with strategies to succeed in guiding their clients, patients,
or charges to the morally right decisions or actions (Thaler and
Sunstein, 2003). For instance, given the assumption that organ
donation is a morally praiseworthy action, a government can yield
an increase in organ donors by making the donation of organs the
default option of which you have to opt-out if you do not want to
be a potential organ donor.
However, nudging in moral contexts raises a lot of issues. First,
it is questionable whether a morally praiseworthy action loses its
praiseworthiness if it had not been performed without the rele-
vant nudge. This depends on whether an action is to be evaluated
only on the basis of its results or also with regard to the states of
mind of the agent. Second, as nudging itself seems morally neu-
tral, the question arises how, taken in isolation, it could help us to
improve moral decision-making and acting at all. Nudging may
well be abused by the nudger for his personal interests. Third, the
practice of nudging itself may be questioned on the ground of fear
for autonomy and respect.
These and other questions will be discussed in Section “Should
We Try to Improve, And Is It Possible?”. For now, we shall out-
line some further means and methods that might be useful for an
improvement of moral practice.
TRAINING
Although already Aristotle suggested that sound judgment needs
practice, there is little empirical research on direct training of
moral decision-making. In as far as it is feasible to train cogni-
tive and emotional functions and such training transfers to other
domains it may also be conceivable to improve moral decision-
making indirectly by training these functions. Working mem-
ory performance increases with training techniques such as an
adaptive dual n-back task (e.g., Jaeggi et al., 2008), or an adap-
tive order-and-location memory task (e.g., Klingberg et al., 2005;
Thorell et al., 2009). Working memory training transfers to other
domains, including fluid intelligence (e.g., Jaeggi et al., 2008),
attention (Thorell et al., 2009), and response inhibition, at least
in children with ADHD (Klingberg et al., 2005). However, transfer
appears to occur primarily in closely related domains (Li et al.,
2008) and only in individuals in which initial training is successful
(Jaeggi et al., 2011).
Response inhibition can be trained with go/no-go and flanker
tasks (Thorell et al., 2009) whereas executive attention improves
after training with a battery of anticipation and stimulus discrim-
ination exercises (Rueda et al., 2005) but training effects seem to
transfer less readily than with working memory training. Based
on the hypothesis that utilitarian components of moral decision-
making depend more on cognitive factors than deontological ones
(Greene et al., 2001), one may speculate that training cognitive fac-
tors would improve specifically utilitarian components of moral
decision-making. However, given that transfer appears to be lim-
ited to closely related domains, it is questionable whether moral
behavior would benefit from such training.
Training of emotional factors can improve aspects of moral
decision-making. For example, a Buddhist compassion-enhancing
technique increases provision of help to another player in a virtual
treasure hunt game (Leiberg et al., 2011). In the same game, the
duration of compassion training correlates with helping particu-
larly in situations in which the other player cannot reciprocate
help. By contrast, compassion training does not affect giving
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money to others in a dictator game, where subjects decide how
to split an amount of money assigned to them between a stranger
and themselves (Leiberg et al., 2011). Taking these findings further,
one may wish to investigate whether deontological components of
moral decision-making are influenced more by emotion training
than utilitarian components.
Through increasing effort-levels required for achieving rein-
forcement as well as exercises such as monitoring and improving
posture, trying to improve mood states, and monitoring eating,
self-control can be increased in humans and rats, respectively
(reviewed in Strayhorn, 2002). Accordingly, it has been proposed
that self-control acts like a muscle that can be trained or fatigued
depending on experience (Baumeister et al., 1994). Insofar as self-
control reflects a virtue, self-control training may be beneficial
from a virtue ethics perspective.
EDUCATION
Moral education has a long tradition and received consideration
from all three philosophical theories introduced above (Althof
and Berkowitz, 2006). It largely follows on from the (deontologi-
cally flavored) views of Piaget and Kohlberg and focuses primarily
on the development of moral reasoning. By contrast, the related
character education has a stronger grounding in virtue ethics and
utilitarianism and aims to promote moral actions leading to good
consequences in educated citizens (Althof and Berkowitz, 2006).
Within a Kohlbergian framework, interventions specifically
designed to promote moral education are more effective than con-
trol interventions or the passage of time (Schlaefli et al., 1985; cf.
King and Mayhew, 2002). Moreover, longer term (up to 12 weeks
is optimal) interventions that focus on peer discussion of moral
dilemmas, thereby leading to practice in moral problem solv-
ing, and interventions that focus on personality development and
self-reflection are more effective than shorter-term interventions
(≤3 weeks) and interventions that focus on academic content such
as criminal justice, law, and social studies (effect sizes: 0.36–0.41
versus 0.09; Schlaefli et al., 1985). Treatment effects are more
pronounced in older (≥24 years old) compared to younger (13–
23 years old) subjects, although this may be partly due to selection
bias (older subjects are more likely to be volunteers) or other
methodological issues. Although the effect sizes of interventions
are small to moderate, they lead to 4–5 years of natural growth
compared to no intervention (Schlaefli et al., 1985), suggesting
that education may be a promising avenue for future research.
PHARMACOLOGICAL ENHANCEMENT
The field of cognitive enhancement by pharmacological means has
received attention in recent years (reviewed, e.g., in Jones et al.,
2005; Illes and Sahakian, 2011) but the first empirical investi-
gations have focused primarily on improving cognition as such,
rather than on moral decision-making. Below, we review a few
example studies with a more direct link to moral behavior. Before
going further though, it is important to note a few caveats:
(1) It is not necessarily the case that more of a given pharma-
ceutical agent results in monotonic increases in function.
Instead, at least some functions may require an intermedi-
ate level of the agent. Increases beyond that level result in
decreases in the function. An example for this notion comes
from working memory and dopamine (reviewed, e.g., in Cools
and D’Esposito, 2011).
(2) Individual differences can moderate the relation of how phar-
maceutical agents affect function. Such individual differences
can be genetic or psychosocial. An example comes from the
Taq1A DRD2 (dopamine D2 receptor) gene, where the pres-
ence of an allele (A1+) is associated with reduced dopamine
receptor concentration, decreased neural responses to reward,
but enhanced neural reward responses after delivery of a D2
receptor agonist compared to A1− subjects (Cohen et al.,
2007). The endeavor of improving a given function may thus
require tailoring agents and dosage to individuals.
(3) Improvements for one function may come at the expense
of costs for another. For instance, improvements in social
functions may come at a cost of reduced cognitive func-
tions. Ethical questions become pertinent in this case in that
one would have to argue why one function is ethically more
important than another.
(4) Pharmaceutical agents administered systemically act in a sus-
tained fashion over time but the relevant functions may be
implemented in a temporally more phasic fashion. Moreover,
the same pharmaceutical agent may have different functions
at different time-scales (for dopamine e.g., Fiorillo et al., 2003;
review in Schultz, 2007).
Intranasal administration of oxytocin (24 international units)
increases trust in the trust game (Kosfeld et al., 2005). More specif-
ically, the average initial amount passed by an investor to a trustee
is 17% higher under oxytocin (45% of participants showing max-
imal trust) than under placebo (21%). Proposers’ offers are also
enhanced by oxytocin in the ultimatum game (Zak et al., 2007).
By contrast, non-social risk taking, trustworthiness of trustees (the
amount returned by trustees) and amounts offered in the dictator
game remain unaffected by oxytocin, excluding less specific effects
on risk perception and prosociality more generally. Thus, oxytocin
enhances an emotional aspect of moral behavior.
The administration of a selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor
(30 mg Citalopram) increases the propensity with which peo-
ple judge harming others as forbidden, if the inflicted harm is
personal and emotionally salient (Crockett et al., 2010a). More-
over, it reduces the rejection of unfair offers in the ultimatum
game (Crockett et al., 2010a; the rejection of unfair offers harms
the proposer). Thus, serotonin may facilitate prosocial behavior
or moral judgments more generally by enhancing aversion to
harming others.
tDCS/TMS
Transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) is a technique
which allows for modulation of regional neural excitability by
means of applications of weak currents. In short, neural activity
(i.e., an action potential) is usually elicited when the membrane
potential – usually −80 mV at rest – is lowered to about −50 mV
via driving inputs through other neurons. Applying weak currents
(usually 1 or 2 mA) over a cortical area can increase or decrease
the resting membrane potential, depending on the position and
polarity (anodal or cathodal) of the electrode. Thus, tDCS can
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lead to an increase or decrease of the excitability and spontaneous
activity in the neural tissue under the electrode.
Transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) is a technique of
non-invasive brain stimulation which uses magnetic impulses to
generate weak currents in specific brain regions. So far, two types
of TMS have been used, single pulse TMS and repetitive TMS
(rTMS). The first type of stimulation affects neural excitability
similarly to anodal tDCS, resulting in a depolarization of the neu-
rons targeted by the magnetic impulses. Such depolarization then
results in the generation of action potentials in the stimulated
neurons. By contrast, rTMS lasts much longer than single pulse
stimulation. Therefore rTMS can increase or decrease the resting
membrane potential of the stimulated brain region, depending
on the intensity and frequency of the stimulation and on the coil
orientation (Fitzgerald et al., 2006).
Using both these techniques scholars have shown that it is possi-
ble to directly manipulate social and non-social behavior in several
tasks including temporal discounting (Figner et al., 2010) and
norm compliance (Ruff et al., in preparation). The latter study
focused directly on moral behavior (i.e., complying with behav-
ior prescribed by a norm). Other studies investigated processes
which are related to moral behavior such as contributing to the
enforcement of a fairness norm by costly punishing defectors, or
mechanisms involved in shaping individuals’ impulsivity.
More specifically, Knoch et al. (2008) tested the role of DLPFC
in punishing unfair behaviors. Measuring the altruistic punish-
ments (Fehr and Gächter, 2002) responders inflicted to unfair
proposers while playing an ultimatum game (Andreoni et al.,
2003), the authors showed that reducing excitability by means
of cathodal tDCS in the DLPFC led to a reduction of punish-
ments, compared to participants with intact DLPFC excitability.
Therefore the authors conclude that the DLPFC neural activ-
ity has a causal role in the willingness to punish fairness norm
violators.
Furthermore, Figner et al. (2010) revealed a role of the LPFC
for self-control in intertemporal choice behavior. Intertempo-
ral choices require one to decide between receiving a smaller
good (e.g., money or food, but also health benefits) in a closer
future (usually immediately, but also in days or months) or
a larger good in a distant future. Depending on the options
an individual chooses it is then possible to measure its level
of self-control: the more she prefers the distant-in-time option
the higher her self-control level. Disrupting LPFC excitability
by means of rTMS resulted in decreased self-control, as people
chose more often the immediate smaller good over the alternative
option.
Taken together these studies show that brain stimulation could
influence two mechanisms strongly related to moral behavior, i.e.,
self-control and willingness to punish norm violators, as they
are involved in social decisions where one is required to choose
between a personal gain or benefiting the society (Elster, 1989;
Fehr and Gächter,2002; Fehr and Fischbacher,2004; Crockett et al.,
2010b).
Furthermore, the link between these two mechanisms and
moral behavior is made more salient in a more recent study by
Ruff et al. (in preparation). In this study we show that the LPFC is
causally necessary to avoid altruistic punishment, inducing people
to share fairly between oneself and another person when punish-
ment for unfair behavior is allowed. More specifically, increased
LPFC excitability (by means of anodal tDCS) resulted in more suc-
cessful social interactions compared to decreased LPFC excitability
(by means of cathodal tDCS) or natural LPFC excitability (sham
stimulation). This study thus suggests that it is possible to improve
moral behavior by increasing sensitivity to punishment threat,
which is possibly achieved as a side effect of improving self-control.
Finally, in a more recent study, Tassy et al. (2012), examined
the effects of disrupting the right PFC by means of rTMS on
moral judgments expressed in the context of moral dilemmas
where a person is called to judge if it is morally permissible to
sacrifice a small number of people (usually one) to save the lives of
many more (usually five). The evidence reported by these authors
show that compared to controls with undisrupted right PFC activ-
ity, disruption leads to a higher likelihood of making utilitarian
judgments.
SHOULD WE TRY TO IMPROVE, AND IS IT POSSIBLE?
Relying on the evidence outlined so far, this final section discusses
the question of whether we should make use of the knowledge
gained from empirical research on human behavior and psychol-
ogy in order to improve moral practice and/or decision-making.
Even if we arrive at a positive answer to this question, however, it
remains unclear, how this project ought to be carried out and
whether, in turn, this is possible. We shall discuss the former
question first and then turn to the question of implementation.
Whether we should strive for moral improvement depends on
(a) whether we believe that it is something worth striving for, (b)
whether, assumed that we think it is, we should strive for it, and
(c) granted that we should, whether the methods and techniques
outlined in this essay provide morally acceptable means for such a
project.
(a) From a consequentialist perspective, moral improvement
tends to be something worth striving for, granted that moral
improvement is understood to yield overall better states of
affairs. However, many people do not share such a conse-
quentialist outlook. Moreover, morality does not seem to be
something we can be passionate about and desire in itself
(Wolf, 1982, p. 424). In a similar vein, Williams (1981) has
argued that it is necessary for our existence to have some per-
sonal “projects,” i.e., action-guiding desires or aims which are
distinct from the pure utilitarian pursuit of happiness or any
other motivation derived from a moral theory.
(b) Prima facie, it seems odd not to strive for moral improvement
if we acknowledge that it is worth striving for it. After all, it is
widely assumed that if we consider something as morally good,
we are motivated to act in a way to bring it about or at least
not to act against it. Likewise, it is assumed that if we believe
we are morally required to ϕ, we are motivated to ϕ (internal-
ism). However, it is debatable whether this very assumption is
correct. On the one hand, it is highly probable that we firmly
believe in something’s being morally good or right and nev-
ertheless do not act accordingly (externalism). Otherwise, the
problem of akrasia would not even arise. On the other hand,
even if a moral belief does motivate us in a certain way, this
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link itself may be questionable from a moral point of view.
For instance, from a consequentialist perspective, it might be
better if everybody acted upon certain rules laid out by some
ethical framework, not upon their own moral convictions. A
second point that can be made in this context is that, as a mat-
ter of fact, people generally strive for moral improvement or at
least they claim to do so, i.e., they want to act in a more decent
way, they want to become morally better individuals, they want
the world to be a morally better place, etc. Three remarks shall
be made about this: First, the folk notions of morally good
individuals, actions, and states of affairs are vague and require
clarification. Second, it is debatable whether people really do
claim to strive for moral improvement and in which contexts
and, again, what they understand by it. Third, it may be ques-
tioned whether their claim is appropriate, i.e., whether they
are in fact concerned about moral improvements or only just
say so. All these and other questions are worth pursuing in the
future.
(c) An extended debate has arisen around this question for every
single method we have outlined above (e.g., for the debate on
enhancement: Douglas, 2008; Savulescu and Bostrom, 2009;
Savulescu et al., 2011). Due to space limitations, we shall
therefore only mention a few important arguments here.
First, the mere possibility of moral improvement may
count in favor of such a project, once it is acknowledged that
moral improvement is desirable and ought to be aimed at.
Furthermore, it may be viewed as an extension of methods
that are already used for moral improvement at present, e.g.,
teaching, self-reflection, etc.
Second, and in contrast to the position just sketched, it may
be doubted that any of the methods and techniques provides
an acceptable way to moral improvement at all. Several rea-
sons may be given for this position. To begin with, one may be
skeptical about whether any of the approaches outlined above
can really yield actual moral improvement. After all, so far
only small, primarily short-term and reversible effects have
been achieved. Yet, although it seems plausible that there is
a limit to improvement given the constraints of the human
mind and body and that moral perfection cannot be achieved,
it seems doubtful that it be not possible to improve at all.
The empirical evidence we have reviewed above supports this
notion.
Also, it may be argued that the methods for improvement
are not reliable because further research is required in order
to allow for their responsible application. However, it may be
replied from a consequentialist perspective that such risks can
be accounted for by calculating the sum of all possible out-
comes each multiplied with the probability of its occurrence.
For some techniques such as nudging, no morally neutral
default option is available: e.g., either a country’s citizens are
organ donors by default or they are not, but each option
invokes moral issues and there is no option outside of the
moral realm.
Third, a debunking argument in favor of applying the tech-
niques and methods described could be established on the
ground that all considerations speaking against such a project
are merely products of a human status quo bias.
Much more could be said on each of the considerations
described above. We assume that enough evidence suggests that
attempts of moral improvement could be believed to be promising.
Let us now turn to the question of implementation: if we
assume that we should try to achieve moral improvement, should
such a project actually be carried out and if so, how? As the matter
here is complex and partly speculative, we shall restrict ourselves
to providing a brief sketch of two issues that are relevant to this
debate.
To even start considering improving moral behavior, one has
to first tackle the complex philosophical issue of identifying a
standard for moral improvement. This might require defining an
ultimate universally accepted moral code, or agreeing on a set of
general moral rules, being these consequentialist rules or non-
consequentialist ones. Such a standard would then have to be used
to gear interventions used to improve moral behavior. Whether
it is in principle possible to identify such a standard, however,
is highly controversial. For one thing, moral relativists hold that
moral standards are relative to a culture (Wong, 1984) and thus
prescribe very different behaviors. Some, for instance, forbid abor-
tion while others allow it. Improving moral behavior may thus be
specific for every moral community sharing the same moral stan-
dards. More profoundly, one may be skeptical about whether it is in
principle possible to achieve agreement on moral questions, given
that current debates about moral issues reveal both intercultural
and intracultural discrepancies. For instance, from a consequen-
tialist perspective, it may be a moral improvement to increase the
number of potential organ donors, but from some religious or
deontological perspectives, this would be regarded as immoral.
Moreover, there is the danger of abuse by the agents or insti-
tutions in charge of implementing a process of moral improve-
ment. Determining a prudent and trustworthy authority for this
task may be extremely difficult if not impossible. Most people
seem unwilling to entrust others with the care of their moral
development.
Second, on a more practical stance, altering moral behavior
may not yield the desired improvement effects or have counter-
productive side effects. For instance, promoting trustfulness may
result in exploitation of trustful agents, and increasing altruistic
behavior may benefit unfairly selfish individuals who could eas-
ily take advantage of altruists. In addition, the danger of a moral
“lock-in” is lurking: once a process of alleged moral improvement
has begun, it may be irreversible, as the moral outlook produced
by this process may prevent us from reviving lost values; mistakes
may become uncorrectable.
In sum, the question of whether we should try to achieve
moral improvement and whether this is possible raises a legion
of extremely controversial questions. Note that the present paper
itself does not mean to take a normative position on the issue
of whether morality should be improved. The above points are
merely meant to provide some leads for the debate.
CONCLUSION
The aim of this paper was to investigate why individuals often
fail to judge and act in a morally decent way and what one can
do about it. Investigations on morally problematic and inconsis-
tent behavior, dominated by, e.g., cognitive biases and emotional
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influences, have revealed two main clusters of reasons: first, agents
reason in fallacious ways, and, second, in judging or acting, they
fail to account for their moral convictions. These phenomena
allow for several ways of improvement. For instance, nudging
may facilitate actions in accordance with moral aims, training,
and education may ameliorate agents’ capacities for moral reason-
ing, pharmacological enhancement and transcranial stimulation
techniques may yield improvements of both moral reflection and
capacity to act morally. However, impact and application spec-
trum of all these methods have not yet been thoroughly studied,
as their development is still an on-going process. An answer to
the question of whether they should be implemented not only
depends on future research in this field but also requires careful
philosophical consideration and societal debate. We believe that
these endeavors are highly relevant for a possible improvement
of moral practice and therefore for the future of humanity in
general.
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